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Abstract 
  We investigate whether the shape of relations between banks and firms has had a 
detectable effect in mitigating the credit contraction that followed Lehman's default in 
September 2008. Using micro data on a large sample of Italian firms, we analyze the relation 
between firms' debt concentration and credit availability. We show that firms borrowing 
from a higher number of banks suffered on average a larger contraction in bank credit and a 
higher probability of experiencing a reduction in outstanding bank debt. The same results 
hold for firms diversifying their borrowing, concentrating a smaller proportion with the main 
bank. The stability of the bank-firm relationship, measured by its duration, also appears to 
have been of some value in mitigating the credit restriction. Our results also suggest the 
existence of a different regime in credit supply towards firms experiencing a reduction in 
outstanding bank debt. If there is a contraction in credit, the decrease is limited if relations 
are more intense i.e. a lower number of financial institutions from which the firm borrows, 
more concentrated lending and relations of greater duration. The opposite is true for firms 
with positive credit growth. 
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* Bank of Italy, Structural Economic Analysis Department - Financial Structure and Intermediaries Division.    1 Introduction1
Bank borrowing is a major source of business ￿rms￿￿nance overall the world. Ac-
cording to Financial Accounts, bank debt represents more than one third of non ￿nancial
￿rms￿total liabilities in Europe and Japan, and about one ￿fth in the US. Bank lend-
ing is particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which face
speci￿c constraints in raising external ￿nance as opposed to large ￿rms. Investors bear
higher costs to gather information about these borrowers, since most of it is not publicly
veri￿able, while ￿nancial intermediaries can exploit scale economies in the collection and
processing of information. The consensus view surfacing from a vast literature that in
the past 20 years investigated, both theoretically and empirically, the structure of bank
lending to SMEs, is that in several circumstances borrowers and lenders bene￿t from
establishing long lasting close relationships. Relationship lending is a sort of implicit
contract that ensures to the ￿rm the availability of ￿nance in the early stage of an
investment project and allows the bank to partake in the returns. Boot (2000) and On-
gena and Smith (2000) review the ￿rst wave of research in this area, Berger and Udell
(2006) discuss the role of relationship banking on the background of the far reaching
transformations experienced by the ￿nancial industry in more recent years.
Banks have been in the ￿re line in the 2007-08 ￿nancial crisis and their lending
capacity has been impaired also in countries where there have not been major events
of distress in the ￿nancial system. In this paper we investigate whether the shape
of relations between banks and ￿rms have had a detectable e⁄ect in mitigating the
credit contraction that followed Lehman￿ s default in September 2008 using Italian micro
data. The case of Italy is an excellent laboratory for several reasons. First, although
Italian banks have been a⁄ected by the ￿nancial crisis, systemic stability has not been
endangered and government intervention has been negligible in comparison to other
countries (Panetta et. Al., 2009). Second, the crisis had a di⁄erent impact on di⁄erent
categories of banks, with the top ￿ve banking groups su⁄ering relatively more from
the drying of wholesale funding markets than smaller intermediaries. Third and most
importantly, in Italy SMEs - highly bank dependent for their funding - account for a
larger share of output than in most comparable countries.
Relationship lending has been documented to be an important feature of ￿rm ￿nanc-
ing in bank oriented ￿nancial systems such as Japan (Aoki and Patrick, 1994), Germany
(Harho⁄ and K￿rting,1998) and Italy (Angelini et al.,1998) as well in more market ori-
1We wish to thank Andrea Generale, Domenico Marchetti, Paolo Pinotti, and seminar participants
at the Bank of Italy and ESWC2010 for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are solely
of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect the views of the Bank of Italy.
5ented ones as the U.S. (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995). Empirical
￿ndings suggest that ￿rms that borrow from a small number of banks, or concentrate
the bulk of their funding in one relation with an intermediary, and preserve their relation
for a relatively long period, face lower ￿nancial constraints and experience better credit
terms and conditions (Elsas, 2005). On the other hand, the stability and the e¢ ciency
of relationship lending appear vulnerable to several factors. First, as long as the rela-
tion provides the bank with soft information about the ￿rm￿ s creditworthiness it also
increases switching costs of both parties. For the ￿rm it may be costly to interrupt the
relation and ￿nd new sources of ￿nance. For instance, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi
(2007) estimate that it takes up to three years to a ￿rm to restore the reduction in
lending induced by the severance of a credit line. Firms may have incentive to trade o⁄
the bene￿ts of close relationships with those of a broader diversi￿cation of their funding
among several banks. For the bank, relationship lending may lead to a sub-optimal
portfolio diversi￿cation and lock in the investment in case of ￿rm distress. This seems
to have been the case in Japan in the 1990s when banks delayed the restructuring of the
corporation with which they had close relationships (Caballero et al., 2008). Second, the
establishing of relationship lending requires that banks can extract ex-post rents from
the ￿rms in order to make pro￿table the ex-ante investment in collecting and process-
ing soft information (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Competition in credit markets tends
therefore to curb the incentives for banks to engage in close relationships. Third, the
e¢ ciency in collecting and processing soft information depends on the internal organiza-
tion of banks with small banks usually having a comparative advantage over larger ones
(Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger et al., 2005). Finally, the relevance of soft information
for ￿rm ￿nancing varies in time and across countries, according to lending technology
(Berger and Udell, 2006), protection of property rights and other institutional factors
(Beck et al. 2008). The degree of cushioning provided to ￿rms by relationship lending
in a downturn is therefore an empirical issue. This has been investigated by two recent
papers. Bodenhorn (2003) using data from a US bank in mid 19th century shows that
borrowers with longer relations were more likely to have loan terms renegotiated during
the credit crunch of 1857. Jiangli et al. (2009) use survey data from four Asian countries
to investigate whether the intensity of banking relationship ensured greater credit avail-
ability to ￿rms during the 1998 Asian ￿nancial crisis. Their results show that Korean
and Thai ￿rms with looser relationships experienced a higher likelihood of being credit
constrained, while the opposite occurred for Philippine ￿rms. None of these papers has
access to information on the amount of credit granted, nor it had access to complete
balance sheet information of borrowing ￿rms.
6Our empirical analysis is based on information from a sample of more than 30,000
Italian corporate borrowers ￿mostly small and medium-sized - and their lending banks.
The vast majority of the ￿rms rely only on intermediate loans as a source of external
￿nance and about 90 per cent of them have more than one relation. Multiple banking
is a long standing characteristic of bank-￿rm relationships in Italy (Foglia et. al, 1998;
Detragiache et al., 2000). This feature of the sample allows us to test whether a main
bank stabilizes the availability of credit during a credit crunch vis-a-vis the alternative
hypothesis that the diversi￿cation of funding sources o⁄ers a better protection. Our
results show that ￿rms which borrow from a larger number of banks experience lower
credit growth, while ￿rms with more concentrated credit experience higher credit growth.
The e⁄ect of the length of the relation with the main bank is ambiguous. Both new and
old enough relations are associated with higher credit growth, while credit contracts
more for relations of intermediate length. Our results also suggests the existence of a
di⁄erent regime in credit supply towards ￿rms experiencing an actual contraction in
outstanding bank debt. Conditional on credit contracting, more intense relations (lower
number of ￿nancial institutions from which the ￿rm borrows from, more concentrated
lending, longer relations) limit the decrease in credit. The opposite is true for ￿rms
with positive credit growth: tighter relationship lending is associated with lower credit
growth. Our results hold controlling for a large number of ￿rm characteristics, including
proxies for ￿rm level credit demand.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset, section 3
discusses the empirical methodology while Section 4 illustrates the results, robustness
checks and extensions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
We match data from di⁄erent sources. The ￿rst is the Italian Credit Register (￿Cen-
trale dei Rischi￿ , CR). This is maintained by the Bank of Italy (the central bank) and
collects from all intermediaries operating in Italy (banks, special purpose vehicles, other
￿nancial intermediaries providing credit) individual information on borrowers with credit
lines and/or loans above 75000 euros with a single intermediary. All di⁄erent forms of
bank debt (mortgages, credit lines, etc.) are included together with information about
the granting institution and the identity (tax code) of the borrower. From the Credit
Register we construct the total outstanding loans of each borrower towards the banks,
7￿nancial companies, special purpose vehicles2 in September 2008 and September 2009.
The ￿nancial crisis in Italy exploded after the default of Lehman Brothers: disruptions
in interbank markets precipitated and credit started decelerating at a fast pace since
September 2008. Therefore, by comparing credit in September 2008 with credit in Sep-
tember 2009 we can investigate the e⁄ect of the crisis on credit dynamics. Loan data
are aggregated at the banking group level. Therefore we considered as originated from
the same bank all loans granted by banks, special purpose vehicles, ￿nancial companies
belonging to the same banking group. This is important since both lending and funding
policies are decided at the banking group level.
The second source of data is the Company Accounts Data Service (￿Centrale dei
Bilanci￿ ), a proprietary database which includes balance sheet information of about
50000 companies, mostly privately owned. CADS is maintained by a consortium of banks
with the purpose of credit risk evaluation. Balance sheet data are from December 2007.
This is important since credit decisions in September 2008 are based on December 2007
balance sheet information. Moreover, importantly, balance sheet variables at December
2007 are predetermined with respect to the dynamic of credit between September 2008
and September 2009. We match data from CADS and from the Credit Register obtaining
a dataset of bank loans matched with balance sheet information of the borrower.
Third, in a robustness check, we merge our data with two surveys run by the Bank
of Italy. The ￿rst is the Conjunctural Survey of Firms conducted at the beginning of
September of each year, in order to use information about ￿rm level forecasts of ￿rm￿ s
investments and ￿nancial needs. The second is the Survey of Investment Manufacturing
(SIM), conducted in April of each year, from which we extract information about the
extent to which ￿rms have been asked by banks to cut outstanding credit lines and loans.
Such information is available for a small subsample of the matched CR-CADS database.
Finally, in a further robustness test, we instrument the controls for relationship lend-
ing. One of the instrument is the change in the concentration of the local credit market
between September 2003 and September 2008. We computed Her￿ndahl Indexes for
each province3 using the data on loans granted by banks as indicated in the Supervisory
Reports submitted by intermediaries to the Bank of Italy.
We include in our sample ￿rms for which we have complete balance sheet information
at December 2007 and which have some debt with the ￿nancial system in September
2This allows to take into account the e⁄ect of securitizations: securitized loans disappear from banks￿
balance sheets and appear on SPVs￿balance sheets. If we only considered loans from banks we would
observe a decrease in outstanding loans, without knowing whether that was due to an actual reduction
in credit granted, or due to the loan being securitized, thus taken o⁄ the bank￿ s balance sheet.
3Provinces correspond roughly to Counties in the United States.
82008. This amounts to 38453 ￿rms. We clean the data from outliers, cutting the top
and bottom ￿rst percentile of the distribution of the dependent variable and of the
distribution of the balance sheet variables we use as controls in the regression (leverage,
ROE, operating margins over value added, share of short term debt, trade debit over
revenues, investment ratio). After these steps our sample reduces to 33846 observations,
which we use for the empirical analysis.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of ￿rms in the sample. Firms have a relatively
high leverage (the mean is about 60 percent), and a relatively high share of short term
debt over total debt (about 70 per cent). This re￿ ects the fact that most ￿rms in
our sample are small or medium sized. Table 1 also includes statistics on relationship
banking variables. The average share of total loans with the main bank is 56%, ￿rms have
relationships with about 5 banks on average, 10.8 percent of ￿rms have relationship with
only one bank, and about 63 percent of relationships are with a top 5 bank (banking
group). We have a measure of the length of the relation with the main bank. Our
measure is truncated at 6 years and this is re￿ ected in its statistics: the mean length is
4.98 years, the median is 6. We explain in further detail how this variable is constructed
in the next section.
Finally, table 2 shows other descriptive statistics for ￿rms in our sample. More than
half of the ￿rms are small or micro, the largest fraction is based in Northern Italy,
the richest area of the country. According to the classi￿cation of borrowers￿riskiness
based on Altman￿ s Z-score, computred by CADS, less than half of the ￿rms are rated as
￿sound￿ , more than a ￿fth as ￿risky￿ .
3 Empirical Strategy
The crisis erupted within the global ￿nancial system, it was unexpected, at least in
its size, and it can be considered as largely an exogenous shock with respect to the
conditions of individual Italian borrowers and to the structure of their relationship with
the banking system. Therefore we exploit this shock to investigate how indicators of
relationship lending a⁄ect the decision of banks to grant credit in the presence of a large
shock on the supply side of funds. Of course, the crisis also impacted on the demand side
of credit. On the one hand, real activity slowed as Italy entered in recession, reducing
the demand for credit. On the other hand, the decrease in revenues caused by the
recession may have increased the reliance of ￿rms on external funding. Since the Italian
￿nancial system is mostly bank based, banks represent the main, often the unique, source
of external ￿nance for most ￿rms, especially small and medium sized. Therefore, the
9impact of the crisis on the demand of bank credit is a priori ambiguous. Nevertheless,
we include controls for the demand of credit by ￿rms in our analysis.
The dramatic impact of the crisis is shown in Table 3, which contains the proportion
of ￿rms with positive credit growth during the crisis period, in 2007 and in 2006. In
both 2006 and 2007, about 60 percent of the ￿rms in the sample experienced positive
credit growth. Since the onset of the crisis that fraction dropped to 40 percent. It is
also interesting to notice that in both 2006 and 2007, the proportion of ￿rms with the
lowest rating which experienced positive credit growth was above the average (about
2-3 percentage points), while during the crisis it dropped below the average. It is not
obvious that such ￿rms experienced the largest drop in demand for working capital, while
they clearly have a demand for credit determined by liquidity needs, and by re-￿nancing
existing debt. If this hypothesis holds, results from the table indicate the presence of
a large shock from the supply side of the credit market, which led banks to cut credit
to riskier borrowers. The table also reports the fraction of smaller ￿rms experiencing a
positive credit growth. This fraction was below the average in both 2006 and 2007 and
above the average during the crisis period. Since smaller ￿rms tend to bank with smaller
intermediaries, this provides evidence supporting the view that it was larger banks, those
more reliant on wholesale markets for funding and those bearing the largest losses from
investment in toxic assets, which su⁄ered most from the crisis, and therefore restricted
credit more to their clients.
3.1 Univariate Analysis
We employ two main measures of credit growth: the ￿rst is the change in credit nor-
malized by ￿rms￿assets. This is useful since the percentage change in credit growth
has a lot of variability at the ￿rm level: when a new mortgage is started, or a new
credit line opened, credit may jump by 20 times or more4. The ￿rst column of Table
4 shows the distribution of normalized credit growth. Both the mean and the median
are slightly negative, indicating a contraction of credit at September 2009 with respect
to one year earlier. The second column of Table 4 shows the distribution of the rate
of growth of credit. It can be seen that its variance is very large, mostly due to the
impact of the start or the repayment of loans and credit lines. Even after cutting the
top and bottom ￿rst percentile, the series indicates a growth rate of about 500 percent
at the 99th percentile. For this reason we use the change in credit normalized by ￿rms￿
4Albertazzi and Marchetti (2009), working on the CR database, use this measure of credit growth for
the same reason.
10assets as our main dependent variable5. Finally, Table 5 shows the percentage of ￿rms
that experienced positive growth of credit, and the average credit growth normalized by
assets, for di⁄erent subsamples of ￿rms. Firms with the lowest rating (more vulnerable)
experienced a stronger credit contraction than the average. The same occurred to ￿rms
whose main bank belongs to the top 5 banking groups, those most a⁄ected by the crisis,
both because of their higher reliance on the interbank markets for funding, and because
of their largest exposure to toxic assets. Interestingly, smaller ￿rms experienced a lower
credit decrease than the average. This may seem unexpected, but it should be borne in
mind that these data are univariate and do not control for the fact that smaller ￿rms
may get credit mostly from smaller banks (less a⁄ected by the turmoil).
3.2 Multivariate Analysis
3.2.1 Base model
The main equation we estimate, models the growth of credit to ￿rm i; normalized by its
total assets, between t = 09=2009 and t ￿ 1 = 09=2008, in province j as follows:
￿crediti;j
assetsi;j;2007
= ￿ + ￿1LEVi;j;2007 + ￿2ROEi;j;2007 + ￿3OM=V Ai;j;2007+
￿4SHSTi;j;2007 + ￿5TDi;j;2007 + ￿6COLLATERALi;j;2007 + ￿7IRi;j;2007+
+￿1REL_LENDi;j;t￿1 + ￿2TOP5i;j;t￿1 + ￿3LONGi;j;t￿1+
+prov2007 + rating2007 + size2007 + industry2007 + "i;j (1)
Firm level variables control for ￿rm characteristics that a⁄ect credit decisions. We expect
leverage (LEV) to have a negative e⁄ect, ROE to have a positive e⁄ect since we control
for the ratio between operating margins and value added (OM/VA) which is a measure
of self ￿nancing ability of the ￿rm. The share of short term debt (SHST) is expected to
have a negative e⁄ect, since it may be considered a measure of ￿nancial fragility. Trade
debit (TD, the ratio of trade debit over revenues) has, a priori, an ambiguous e⁄ect.
On the one hand it may be seen as a substitute for bank credit. On the other hand,
it may be seen as a signal that the ￿rm needs funding to ￿nance its working capital.
Moreover, a higher fraction of trade debit may be associated with a higher fraction of
trade credit, which is often used as collateral by smaller ￿rms to obtain bank credit
5We also performed the empirical analysis using the percentage change in credit and results about
the controls for relationship lending hold. However, some of the other controls have the wrong sign, and
in general the model is estimated less precisely.
11(Omiccioli 2005). We include a dummy variable (COLLATERAL) which takes the value
one if the ￿rm had some credit assisted by collateral at September 2008. This variable
may capture the riskiness of the ￿rm, but it may also capture the fact that ￿rms have
assets which can be o⁄ered as collateral to banks. Thus, the sign of this coe¢ cient is
a priori ambiguous. Finally, we control for investment ratio (IR, investment over value
added). This, together with trade debit, aims at capturing demand for credit at the ￿rm
level: ￿rms that invest a higher fraction of their value added require more funding. In a
robustness exercise, we include a direct measure of ￿rm level demand, which is available
for a subsample of ￿rms.
Our main interest is on relationship banking variables. First, we include variables
describing the structure of ￿rms￿relations with the ￿nancial system (REL_LEND). We
investigate the e⁄ect of the number of banking relationships (# OF BANKS) and of
the share of total credit held by the main banking group (SHARE MAIN BANK). We
include either the number of banking relationships, or the share of the main bank as a
measure of the concentration of the relations, but not both at the same time since the
two measures have a high correlation. As argued in the introduction, more concentrated
relations have, in theory, an ambiguous e⁄ect on credit growth in a period of crisis. On
the one hand, the implicit contract embedded in relationship lending should ensure ￿rms
obtain adequate credit in times of troubles. Banks obtain rents over time from a closer
relation with a ￿rm, and they may not want to dissipate them. On the other hand, the
crisis decreased banks￿ability to bear losses and they may not want to be too much
exposed to a single ￿rm, deciding to cut credit more to ￿rms in which they have a larger
share of credit. Therefore, the e⁄ect of the concentration of lending on credit growth
must be veri￿ed empirically.
Second, we control for the duration of a ￿rm￿ s relation with its main bank, adding
the number of years in which the main bank at September 2008 has been among the ￿rst
three banks providing funds to the ￿rm (LENGTH). In theory, the e⁄ect of the duration
of the relation with the main bank is a priori ambiguous since banks may decide to keep
lending to borrowers with whom they have a longer relation, as the informational capital
embedded in the relation increases switching costs to both parties. On the other hand, if
a bank is hit by a shock, it may want to improve the quality of its portfolio by selecting
safer new borrowers while restructuring the existing portfolio of loans. Moreover, the
longer the relation, the easier it may be for a bank to hold the ￿rm up, reducing credit
without loosing the client, since ￿rms with a longer relation have higher switching costs.
The distribution of credit growth conditional on the length of the relationship with the
main bank is shown in Table 6. Our measure is truncated at 6 years, since we do not
12have information about credit relations prior to 2002.6 The table shows that credit
growth is higher for ￿rms that recently initiated a new relation with their main bank.
Then, it decreases until the 5th year, and then it increases for ￿rms whose relation with
their main bank is older than 6 years. This pattern is even more evident if attention is
limited to the growth in revolving credit lines. We perform a further check by estimating
the model including a quadratic term for the length of the relation, in order to capture
possible nonlinearity that seem to emerge from the data shown in Table 6.
As a last control of relationship lending, we include a dummy variable for whether
the main banking group is among the 5 major groups in Italy (TOP5). This is expected
to have a negative e⁄ect on credit growth, since larger banks are those that were most
a⁄ected by the crisis. As a robustness check, we also include main bank ￿xed e⁄ects,
and ￿xed e⁄ects for the combination of the ￿rst three banks, i.e., we include a ￿xed
e⁄ects if a ￿rm has bank A as main bank, then bank B and bank C as second and third
banks, in terms of share of total credit, and a di⁄erent ￿xed e⁄ect if a ￿rm has bank
B as main bank, bank A and C as second and third banks, and so on (we also take
care of cases in which ￿rms have only one or two banks). This allows to control for
unobserved heterogeneity in the main banks which may be correlated with relationship
lending variables.
All regressions include a set of industry ￿xed e⁄ects (de￿ned at the 2 digit NACE
level, yielding a set of 55 industry dummies), 103 province ￿xed e⁄ects for the province
in which the ￿rm has its head o¢ ce, ￿xed e⁄ects for the 4 size classes listed in Table 2
(this classi￿cation is based on the number of employees, or on assets when the number
of employees is not available), and ￿xed e⁄ects for the rating classes listed in Table 2.
Table 7 shows pairwise correlations among regressors.
3.2.2 Causality
We aim at investigating whether the presence of tighter relations with banks helped
￿rm weathering the shock to credit supply caused by the ￿nancial crisis. Hence, we
aim at identifying a causal e⁄ect of relationship lending on credit growth. However,
our measures of relationship lending may capture some ￿rm￿ s unobserved characteristics
which determine both the structure of a ￿rm￿ s relation with banks, and the extent to
which the ￿rm obtains credit. The ￿rst issue is that controls for relationship lending
may be a⁄ected by ￿rm￿ s riskiness or quality: for example, banks may be more willing to
hold a higher share of a ￿rm￿ s total credit outstanding (hence, the bank is less diversi￿ed
6We may be able to extend our information beyond that date, thus getting a more precise measure
of the length of the relation with the main bank.
13towards that ￿rm), if they believe the ￿rm is less risky, and less risky ￿rms may be more
likely to experience higher credit growth. To account for this possibility, we control for
pro￿tability, leverage, maturity of outstanding debt, ￿rm size and rating using ￿rms￿
balance sheet information. Such variables are key determinants of the decision of banks
to grant credit to ￿rms, and also of the quantity of credit granted. We also control
for the presence of collateralized debts at September 2008, since this is a measure of
￿rm￿ s riskiness (although its sign is ambiguous: ￿rms required to post collateral may be
riskier, but at the same time, ￿rms which are able to post collateral may be less risky).
Furthermore, we estimate the model on a number of subsamples of ￿rms, notably, ￿rms
which have more than one bank (we exclude single banked ￿rms), ￿rms with the lowest
rating, smaller ￿rms. In these cases, ￿rms are more homogeneous; in particular, ￿rms
are more similar in terms of riskiness, opaqueness, quality. Hence, the variability in the
structure of relationship lending should not be a⁄ected by ￿rm￿ s quality or riskiness,
since these are roughly the same for all ￿rms within the subsample. We believe that all
the control variables we include and the robustness exercises we perform are su¢ cient
to control for unobservable ￿rm quality, or riskiness which may jointly in￿ uence credit
growth, and the strength of a ￿rm￿ s relationship with the banking system.
The second issue is that the structure of the relationship we observe at September
2008 may also re￿ ect the past growth of the ￿rm, previous investments, or other factors
related to the past history of the ￿rm, which may also in￿ uence the extent to which the
￿rm obtains (or demands) credit during the crisis period. We use di⁄erent strategies to
deal with this potential omitted variable problem. First, we proxy for ￿rm level demand
for credit in our estimates, and we also use a direct measure of ￿rm level demand for
credit for a subsample of ￿rms. Second, we estimate the model including measures of
credit growth in 2006 (December 2006 over December 2005) and 2007 (December 2007
over December 2006). These controls should capture most of the factors that contributed
to determine the structure of relationship lending that we observe at September 2008.
Third, we estimate the model using as a dependent variable the growth rate of revolving
credit lines only. Revolving credit lines can be cut with little notice by banks, so that
they are less a⁄ected by past ￿rm￿ s history. Hence, balance sheet data at December 2007
are su¢ cient to capture the determinants of granted credit lines, together with controls
for ￿rm demand for credit.
Finally, in order to tackle possible biases due either to unobservable ￿rm quality, or to
past ￿rm￿ s development history, we instrument the variables capturing the concentration
of the relationship and its duration using the size of the ￿rm at December 20057 and
7Using size at December 2005 seems to be a good compromise between ensuring su¢ cient strength
14the change in the concentration of local credit markets by computing the rate of the
change in the Her￿ndahl index of loans computed at the province level. On the one
hand, the size of the ￿rm is arguably not a determinant of credit growth at September
2008, once balance sheet data at December 2007 are controlled for. Moreover, it is likely
not a measure of ￿rm￿ s quality at September 2008. On the other hand, it is correlated
with the structure of relationship lending we observe at September 2008, since this may
depend on existing relationships, which are likely to be determined by ￿rm size. The
change in the Her￿ndahl index captures the change in the possibility that borrowers
switch to a di⁄erent main bank. This is arguably not correlated with a single ￿rm￿ s
riskiness or quality since it is computed at the province level.
A last concern relates to the fact that the relationship lending variables may also
capture unobserved bank characteristics. Di⁄erent banks may have a di⁄erent policy
about the maximal accepted exposure towards the same borrower. This policy may also
be related to the capitalization of the bank and to the extent to which the bank has
been a⁄ected by the crisis. We address these potential concerns by estimating the model
including main bank, and ￿combination of banks￿￿xed e⁄ects, as described in section
3.2.1.
Overall, we believe that our identi￿cation strategy and the robustness checks we
perform provide support to the hypothesis that we are estimating a causal e⁄ect of
relationship lending on credit growth.
4 Results
4.1 Base regressions
Equation 1 is our main model. This is estimated by OLS, and results are displayed in
Table 8. We investigate the e⁄ect of di⁄erent measures of relationship lending. In the
￿rst column, we include the (log of) number of banks the ￿rm is getting credit from,
and the length of the relation with the main bank as controls for relationship lending.
Results show that getting credit from more bank reduces credit growth. The e⁄ect is
both statistically and economically signi￿cant: a one standard deviation increase in the
number of banks the ￿rm has a relation with, determines a lower credit growth of about
0.42 percentage points. This is relatively large, when compared to a mean credit growth
of -1.87. A longer relation appears to negatively a⁄ect credit growth. Finally, whether
of the instrument and ensuring it is reasonably exogenous. Results still hold if size at December 2004 is
used, but they become weaker if size in previous years is used instead.
15the main bank belongs to a top 5 group has a negative, and signi￿cant (at the 5% level)
e⁄ect on credit growth. This indicates there is some di⁄erence between the behavior of
larger banks and that of smaller ones. Column 2 shows results from the same model in
which the share of credit held by the main bank is included in place of the number of
bank relationships. All results are similar. Firms whose main bank has a larger share
experience higher credit growth. In particular, one standard deviation increase in the
share of the main bank raises credit growth by about 0.6 percentage points. That, again,
is a large e⁄ect, as it represents about a third of average credit growth. Finally, column
3 shows results from the same model estimated on the subsample of ￿rms which have
relations with more than one intermediary (hence, single banked ￿rms are excluded).
Results are essentially unchanged.
Balance sheet variables have the expected sign in all regressions. Firms with higher
leverage, lower return on equity, higher share of short term debt experienced a lower
credit growth. A higher share of trade debit over revenues is associated instead with
higher credit growth. As argued above, trade debit may capture both demand for credit,
and the simultaneous presence of trade credit, which is often used as collateral for bank
credit. The dummy for the presence of collateralized debt is negative, signi￿cant only in
the regression controlling for the share of the main bank. Finally, the investment ratio
is positive and signi￿cant. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the investment
ratio proxies for the demand for credit at the ￿rm level.
4.2 Banks￿unobserved characteristics
As argued above, the measures of relationship lending may be correlated with banks￿
unobserved characteristics which also a⁄ect the willingness to extend credit to ￿rms.
Regressions shown in Table 9 address this concern.
In columns 1 and 2 we include ￿xed e⁄ects for the main bank. Results for the
measure of relationship lending hold. Interestingly, the dummy for collateralized debt
is still negative, but now signi￿cant in all regressions, indicating that credit grows less
(contracts more) for ￿rms which posted some collateral for their bank debt.
In columns 3 and 4 we perform a much more demanding exercise: we include a ￿xed
e⁄ect for every combination of the three main banks (and of course a di⁄erent ￿xed
e⁄ect if there is only one or two banks). For example, we include a ￿xed e⁄ect if the ￿rm
has relations with bank A, a di⁄erent ￿xed e⁄ect if it has relations with bank A as main
bank and bank B as second bank, a further di⁄erent ￿xed e⁄ect if the ￿rm has bank B
as main bank and bank A as second bank, and so on. This amounts to including about
1613500 dummies which allow to control for strategic interactions among banks: being the
main bank for a ￿rm may depend on what are the other banks, and this may be related
to the strategy and the capital strength of the bank, which also a⁄ect the willingness to
extend credit to the ￿rm during the crisis. Remarkably, the main results hold: having
relations with more banks is associated with lower credit growth, while a higher share
of credit held by the main bank is associated with higher credit growth. All regressors
behave essentially as in the base model.
In the remaining robustness checks and extensions we do not include main bank ￿xed
e⁄ects in order to be able to estimate the dummy for the main bank belonging to one
of the major 5 groups. However, all results shown from now on hold when main bank
￿xed e⁄ects are included.8
4.3 Sample splits
As a further step we perform a series of sample splits to investigate the e⁄ect of our
relationship lending variables on speci￿c classes of ￿rms. The ￿rst results are displayed
in Table 10. Columns 1 and 2 show estimates for the subsample of micro and small ￿rms.
The main results are unchanged: having more relationships has a negative e⁄ect on
credit growth, while a higher concentration of credit within the main bank is positively
associated with credit growth. A longer relationship with the same main bank has a
negative e⁄ect. Interestingly, now, the coe¢ cient for the dummy main bank belongs to
a top 5 group is about -0.4 percentage points, sensibly larger, in absolute value, than
that estimated on the whole sample. Balance sheet variables behave broadly as in the
whole sample. Columns 3 and 4 display results for the subsample of manufacturing ￿rms
(NACE codes between 15 and 36), and results are very similar.
Table 11 shows results from two further sample splits. Columns 1 and 2 contain
estimates from the subsample of ￿rms whose main bank does not belong to a top 5 group.
Results on the concentration of the relationship keep holding. On the contrary, the
measure for the duration of the relation with the same main bank is now not signi￿cant.
Finally, columns 3 and 4 show results from the subsample including ￿rms with the lowest
rating. Results are very similar. More concentrated relationships are associated with
higher credit growth; the duration of the relation has a small and not signi￿cant e⁄ect.
Interestingly, the dummy for the main bank belonging to a top 5 group is negative and
highly signi￿cant, and large in size. It indicates that ￿rms in the lowest rating class,
8Comparing Tables 7 and 8, it can be noticed that the size of the coe¢ cients for the concentration
of lending change vary little when bank ￿xed e⁄ects are included. This indicates that the correlation
between banks unobserved characteristics and the concentration of lending is small.
17whose main bank belongs to a top 5 group experience a lower credit growth of about
0.9 percentage points. This suggests that larger banks, which have stronger need to
recapitalize, have been more aggressive in cutting lending to worse borrowers.
In general, the size of the coe¢ cients for the measures of concentration of relation-
ship lending is larger than in the whole sample. This may indicate a larger e⁄ect of
concentration of ￿rm￿ s borrowing on credit growth, for these important subsets of ￿rms.
This was expected, since in theory, ￿rms which are more likely to experience di¢ culties
to raise ￿nance during a crisis, such as smaller and riskier ￿rms, should bene￿t more
from stronger relationships with banks.
4.4 A di⁄erent measure of ￿rm level demand for credit
We also extend our analysis using a direct measure of ￿rm￿ s demand for credit. The
Conjunctural Survey run by the Bank of Italy in September of every year asks ￿rms
how much they plan to cover their funding needs using debt. We use the answers to
this question in the Survey run in September 2008 to control for ￿rm level demand,
as an alternative to the investment ratio. This has the advantage of being a more
precise measure of demand for credit. The drawback is that the sample of ￿rms for
which this information is available is much smaller, and, importantly, it is more biased
towards better ￿rms: 16 percent of ￿rms have the lowest rating and 50 percent the
highest, compared to, respectively, 21.8 percent and 42.4 percent in the whole sample.
Results are displayed in Table 12 and are broadly similar to those from the main model
(columns 3 and 4 include main bank ￿xed e⁄ects): a larger number of banks decreases
credit growth, while a higher share of the main bank is positively associated with credit
growth. The duration of the relation with the main bank does not have a signi￿cant
e⁄ect.
4.5 Distinguishing positive and negative credit growth
As an extension to the analysis, we estimate a Probit model for the probability that
credit increased, using the same control as in the main regression. This analysis provides
complementary information to that given by the regression of the change in the quantity
of credit. This model indicates what variables are positively associated to an increase
in credit during the ￿nancial turmoil. Results (marginal e⁄ects) are displayed in Table
13 and show important di⁄erences with the base model. Firstly, ￿rms with more bank
relationships have a higher probability of experiencing positive credit growth, although
the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant only at the 10 percent level. Secondly, the share of the
18main bank is not signi￿cant9. Third, longer relations have a non-linear e⁄ect on the
probability the ￿rm experiences positive credit growth.
This suggests that relationship lending has a di⁄erent e⁄ect on the decision to grant
more credit, than on the decision of how much more credit to grant. Hence it may be
informative to investigate ￿rms which experienced positive credit growth separately from
￿rms which experienced a contraction in credit. We do this by estimating a Tobit II
model which allows to model separately the decision to increase or contract credit from
the amount of the expansion/contraction. We estimate the model using the Heckman
two step procedure, which imposes little structure on the distribution of error terms.
In the estimation of the probability that credit grows, we use a dummy for whether
￿rms were drawing credit above the maximal amount agreed at September 2008 as an
excluded variable (OVERDRAFT). This is arguably negatively related to the probability
that credit grows, but it should not determine the amount by which credit changes, since
it is just an indicator variable, not capturing the size of the over-draft10. Estimates from
this analysis are shown in Tables 14 and 15.
When we investigate ￿rms for which credit increased, having relations with more
banks has a positive e⁄ect both on the probability that credit increases, and on the
amount by which it raises. Similarly a higher share of the main bank does not a⁄ect the
probability credit increases, but it reduces the amount by which it raises. Hence ￿rms
which receive most part of their credit from their main bank experience a slower credit
growth. In both cases, a longer relation has a negative e⁄ect both on the likelihood credit
increases and on quantity. In the equation for the probability that credit increases, the
dummy for having an overdraft is signi￿cant and negative, as expected, so that ￿rms
with an overdraft in September 2008 are less likely to experience positive credit growth
between September 2008 and September 2009.
The analysis of ￿rms that experienced a decrease in credit yields very interesting
results, too. These are displayed in Table 15. Having relations with a larger number of
banks decreases the chances that credit contracts (this is obvious since it is the same
result as in Table 14), but a larger number of banks increases the amount of the con-
traction in credit. The share of the main bank has a similar e⁄ect: although it has
no in￿ uence on the probability that credit contracts, a larger share of credit within the
9This occurs also when the analysis is restricted to the subsample of ￿rms with more than one
relationship, displayed in column 3.
10Alternatively, we estimated the model using a dummy for whether the ￿rm was classi￿ed as a non
performing borrower at June 2008. This is clearly negatively correlated with the probability that credit
grows, but not related to the quantity of the credit change. Results are very similar if we use this
alternative strategy. However, the fraction of ￿rms classi￿ed as non performing borrowers was very
small (0.2% of the ￿rms in the sample).
19main bank leads to a much more moderate contraction in credit. Now the duration of the
relationship with the main bank has a di⁄erent e⁄ect: credit contraction is limited, the
longer the duration. Interestingly, the dummy for the presence of collateral is positive
and signi￿cant. This indicates that, conditional on credit contracting, the presence of
collateralized debt is associated with a lower contraction in credit. This may capture a
lower perceived riskiness among the group of ￿rms experiencing a contraction in credit:
those which have valuable collateral manage to limit the contraction in credit since part
of their debt is secured.
Overall, these results suggest that relationship lending acts as a sort of ￿parachute￿
for ￿rms experiencing a contraction in credit. A tighter (more concentrated) relation
leads to a milder drop in credit. However, tighter relations limit the growth in credit
for ￿rms experiencing an expansion in credit: those with weaker relations are more
likely to experience a larger growth in credit, conditional on credit growing. These
results are consistent with the theory. On the one hand, relationship lending is useful in
di¢ cult times: ￿rms experiencing a contraction in credit are more protected if they have
tighter relations. On the other hand, banks which are less diversi￿ed are less willing to
increase their exposure to the same ￿rm, especially in times of crisis, so that ￿rms with
tighter relations are partly held-up when they try to increase credit. These results hold,
conditional on controls for ￿rm riskiness, pro￿tability and demand for credit.
4.6 The duration of relations with the main bank
We investigate in further depth the results concerning the duration of the relation with
the main bank. Descriptive statistics indicate that there might be a non-linear relation
between the duration of the relation with the main bank and credit growth. In this
section we explore regressions including a quadratic term for the duration of the relation
to capture the possibility that both short and long relations are associated with higher
credit growth. Table 16 show results. It can be seen that the linear term is negative,
while the quadratic term is positive. This indicates that as the length of the relation
with the main bank increases, credit ￿rst contracts, then starts raising. The results
imply that the latter occurs for relations longer than 5.6 years.11 This is consistent with
the idea that banks face a trade-o⁄between building or keeping a relation, and breaking
it. First, in order to build relations with new borrowers, banks grant more credit: the
value of building a relation is high. As the relation gets more mature, the bene￿t from
keeping it may not be very large: the relation has been built, but the relational capital
11This is obtainted by taking the derivative of the equation with respect to LENGTH and setting it
to zero. This gives -1.122+0.101*LENGTH, which yields LENGTH=5.6 years.
20it embeds is not very high. As the relation gets su¢ ciently long, tough, the bank has
signi￿cantly invested in the relation and breaking it would be too costly. Therefore, if
the bank needs to choose where to cut credit, it will likely do so to ￿rms with which the
value of keeping the relation is not that high, which occurs for intermediate durations
of the relationship.
4.7 Credit rationing
We further extend the analysis investigating the e⁄ect of relationship lending on the
probability of being credit constrained. To this aim, we use information from the Survey
on Investment of Manufacturing ￿rms (SIM), run by the Bank of Italy in April of every
year. The April 2009 survey included questions about the impact of the crisis and in
particular whether the ￿rm had a credit line called or cut by one of its banks. In theory,
we should expect ￿rms with tighter relations with their banks to be less likely to be
asked to cut their borrowing. Results are displayed in Table 17 (the table shows marginal
e⁄ects). Firms with more relations are more likely to be asked to cut their borrowing.
Increasing the number of banks raises the chances of being asked to cut borrowing by
about 2.5 per cent, when computed at the average number of banks per ￿rm. Similarly,
￿rms whose main bank has a higher share of total credit have a lower probability of
being asked to cut credit. An increase in the share of credit held by the main bank,
computed at the average share (56.22), reduces the probability the ￿rm is asked to
reduce its borrowing by about 0.2 percent. The duration of the relation seems to have
no e⁄ect on the probability the ￿rm is required to cut credit lines or loans. Interestingly,
￿rms whose main bank is a top 5 group are less likely to be required to cut borrowing,
although this e⁄ect is signi￿cant only at the 10 percent level and only when the number
of relations is included. This can be reconciled to previous results by noting that ￿rms
surveyed in SIM are larger and less likely to have the lowest rating than the average ￿rm
in the sample. Said di⁄erently, smaller and riskier ￿rms are under-represented in SIM,
and these are the ￿rms for which the dummy TOP5 had a signi￿cant, and negative,
e⁄ect. Then, now, the dummy TOP5 is suggesting that larger banks are less likely to
cut credit to ￿rms that are on average larger and safer. This can be consistent with the
evidence that such banks are those most a⁄ected by the crisis, since if these banks are
struggling to restructure their portfolios of loans, they are especially keen on keeping
good relations with their best clients.
Balance sheet variables behave as expected: less pro￿table ￿rms, ￿rms with a larger
share of short term debt and ￿rms with collateralized debt, experience a higher proba-
21bility of being cut credit lines.
4.8 A further look into causality
Finally, we further test the robustness of our results, controlling for the possibility that
the past history of the ￿rm jointly a⁄ects both the structure of the relationship between
the ￿rm and banks, and credit growth. This is important to understand whether the
e⁄ect of relationship lending can be given a causal interpretation.
As a ￿rst check, we include credit growth in 2007 and 2006 (normalized by total
assets) among the regressors. These variables capture the dynamics of credit in the past,
and thus the history of the relations of the ￿rm with the banking system. Hence, they
may capture unobserved e⁄ects that may have in￿ uenced the build-up of the structure of
the relation with banks. If such factors are also relevant for the current decision to grant
credit, then we would be solving a possible omitted variable bias a⁄ecting our estimates.
Results are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 18, and are very similar to the base
model. In particular, the size of the coe¢ cients of the controls for relationship lending
are remarkably similar to those in the base model, indicating very little correlation with
past credit growth.
As a second step we investigate the growth of revolving credit lines only. Credit
lines can be easily terminated by banks (or by ￿rms) and they are less likely to be
in￿ uenced by factors that may a⁄ect the structure of banking relations, once the latest
available balance sheet data are controlled for. Results, shown in columns 3 and 4 of
Table 18, indicate that more relations lead to lower growth of credit lines, more credit
concentrated into the main bank leads to higher growth of revolving credit lines, keeping
the same main bank for a longer period has no e⁄ect on the growth of revolving credit
lines. Coe¢ cients for concentration of the relationship are larger in absolute value than
in the base model, indicating a stronger e⁄ect on the growth of credit lines, than on the
overall growth of credit. The e⁄ect of the length of the relation is similar to the base
model.12
Finally, we instrument the measures of concentration of lending and of the duration
of the relationship with the main bank. We use two instruments. The ￿rst is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if the ￿rm was in the micro or small category at December
2005. On the one hand, this is arguably not a determinant of credit growth at September
2008, once balance sheet data at December 2007 are controlled for. Moreover, it is likely
not a measure of ￿rm￿ s quality or riskiness at September 2008. On the other hand, it
12We also run regressions adding a quadratic term for the length of the relation with the main bank.
In this case, when revolving credit lines are considered, both measures of length are not signi￿cant.
22is correlated with the structure of relationship lending we observe at September 2008,
since this may depend on existing relationships, which are likely to be determined by
￿rm size. The second is the change in the Her￿ndahl index on loans by banks computed
at the province level. This captures the change in the possibility that ￿rms have to
switch to a di⁄erent borrower. This is arguably not correlated with each ￿rm￿ s speci￿c
quality or riskiness, since the index is computed at the province level.13
Results are shown in Table 19. Columns 1 and 4 show 2SLS estimates, while columns
2, 3 and 4, 5 show the ￿rst stage. It can be seen that results hold and are qualitatively
the same as in the base model. The instruments are signi￿cant and have the expected
sign: smaller ￿rms in December 2005 are less likely to have more relations, and have a
larger share of credit held by the main bank. An increase in the concentration of the local
credit market increases the length of the relationship with the main bank. The F-statistic
are well above the threshold of 10, indicating that estimates do not su⁄er from weak
instrument problems. Results indicate that the measures of the concentration of lending
have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on credit growth: the more concentrated the relationship the
higher credit growth (the smaller the credit conctraction). On the contrary, the length
of the relationship with the main bank is not signi￿cant.
4.9 Disentangling the behavior of the main bank
So far, we have investigated the e⁄ect of relationship lending on the total credit a ￿rm
gets from the system, without measuring the amount of credit obtained from di⁄erent
banks. The evidence we found suggests that more concentrated and less diversi￿ed
borrowing dampened the contraction in credit. However, this could be driven by the
behavior of other banks than the main bank. Hence, a natural and interesting question
to ask is what has the behavior of the main bank been. In other words: did the main
bank expand/contract credit more/less than the other banks? In order to answer this
question we disaggregate total loans from the banking system, distinguishing between
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where the dependent variable is the growth in credit to ￿rm i from bank j between
September 2008 and September 2009, normalized by ￿rm￿ s assets; main_bankj is a
13For this reason, we do not include province ￿xed e⁄ects in the IV-regressions. We include dummies
for the three macro areas (North, Center, South), instead. A table with descriptive statistics of the
change in the Her￿ndahl index is available upon request.
23dummy taking the value equal to one if bank j is the main bank and ￿i is a ￿rm
￿xed e⁄ect. This captures all unobservable and observable ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics,
including ￿rm￿ s quality and ￿rm￿ s demand for credit. Hence, for all ￿rms we have two
observations, credit from the main bank, and credit from all the other banks. Results14
are shown in Table 20. The ￿rst row shows the base regression: the coe¢ cient for the
dummy main bank is positive but not signi￿cant, indicating no di⁄erence in the behavior
of the main bank with respect to the other banks. Rows 2 shows estimates including
￿xed e⁄ects for the main bank and for the bank with second highest share of credit.
The coe¢ cient for the dummy main bank is still positive but it is now signi￿cant at the
5 percent level, indicating that the main bank tends to increase credit more (contract
credit less) than other banks. Rows 3 and 4 show results from the subsamples of ￿rms
with positive and with negative total credit growth15, respectively. It can be seen that
the dummy main bank is negative in the former case, indicating that the main bank
increases credit less (or even decreases it) for ￿rms experiencing positive credit growth.
On the contrary, the coe¢ cient for the dummy main bank is positive in the subsample of
￿rms experiencing a credit contraction, indicating that the main bank decreases credit
less than the other banks, or even increases it. This result is in line with what we found
in subsection 4.6, con￿rming the idea that the main bank tends to act as a parachute for
￿rms experiencing a contraction in credit. Rows 5 and 6 investigate the behavior of the
main bank in the subsample of ￿rms with lowest and medium-high rating, respectively.
The coe¢ cient for the dummy main bank is positive in the former case and negative in
the latter. Hence, the main bank tends to increase credit more (decrease credit less) to
more vulnerable ￿rms, than non-main banks do. Finally, we investigate the behavior of
the main bank as a function of whether it belongs to the 5 largest groups. Results in
rows 7 and 8 indicate that the main bank tends to increase credit, or to dampen the
credit contraction if it is does not belong to the 5 largest group, consistent with the
evidence provided in the rest of the paper and with the anecdotal evidence indicating
that the 5 largest groups where most a⁄ected by the crisis.
Overall, results in this subsection are consistent with our previous ￿ndings. The
analysis on loan level data including ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects has the advantage of controlling
for such ￿rms￿characteristics as unobservable quality, riskiness, demand for credit. The
14We cut observations below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles of the distribution of credit growth
(normalized by assets). We also exclude ￿rms excluded from the sample in the rest of the paper because
of very high (above the 99th percentile) or very low (below the 1st percentile) balance sheet variables.
We also exclude ￿rms borrowing from a single bank.
15This means positive or negative credit growth from all banks. There may well be cases of positive
overall credit growth and negative credit growth from the main bank, positive credit growth and negative
credit growth from banks other than the main bank, and so on.
24disadvantage is that we can only estimate a dummy for main banks and we cannot
estimate the e⁄ect of the concentration of borrowing. However, results point in the same
direction: the main bank provides more credit to ￿rms experiencing a credit contraction
and ￿rms with the lowest rating. Moreover, main banks belonging to one of the 5 largest
groups extend less credit to ￿rms.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate whether characteristics of bank-￿rm relationships, widely
studied in the banking literature, have had a sizeable e⁄ect in mitigating the credit
contraction that followed Lehman￿ s default in September 2008. Speci￿cally, using micro
data on a large sample of Italian ￿rms, we looked at the relation between ￿rms￿bank debt
concentration and credit availability. Our results lend support to the view that ￿rms that
borrow from a small number of banks are more insulated from supply shocks in credit
markets. We show that ￿rms borrowing from more banks su⁄ered on average a larger
contraction in the availability of bank credit and a higher probability of experiencing
a reduction in outstanding bank debt. The same results hold for ￿rms which diversify
their borrowing, concentrating a smaller fraction of it with the main bank. The stability
of the bank-￿rm relationship, measured by its duration, appears to have had a less clear-
cut e⁄ect in dampening the credit restriction: the downturn seems to have prompted
banks to preserve older customers only if the relationship was in place for long enough.
Our results also suggest the existence of a di⁄erent regime in credit supply towards
￿rms experiencing an actual contraction in outstanding bank debt. Conditional on credit
contracting, more intense relations (smaller number of ￿nancial institutions from which
the ￿rm borrows from, and more concentrated lending) limit the decrease in credit. The
opposite is true for ￿rms with positive credit growth: tighter relationship lending is
associated with lower credit growth, while the duration of the relation has little e⁄ect.
This evidence is consistent with the view that banks tend to support ￿rms which have a
higher stake, once they get under stress. We also show that more concentrated relations
reduce the likelihood ￿rms are asked by banks to cut their outstanding loans. Our results
hold in a variety of robustness checks. In particular, they hold on subsamples of smaller
and riskier ￿rms. Our identi￿cation strategy and our robustness checks suggests that
the e⁄ect of relationship lending on the availability of credit has a causal nature. Finally,
we also provide some evidence that concentration in local credit markets has a negative
e⁄ect on credit growth.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES Mean Median
Firms￿Balance Sheet
Leverage (LEV) 59.50 65.6
Roe 5.02 5.34
Operating margins / Value added (OM/VA) 34.99 36.47
Share of short term debt over total (SHST) 71.50 79.79
Trade debit / Revenues (TD) 26.86 23.80
Investment ratio (IR) 3.64 -0.278
Total assets (Euros) 19931840 9308000
Firms￿relation with the credit market
Total credit at september 2008 (Euros) 6622676 2870504
Total credit at september 2009 (Euros) 6245171 2637312
Share of main bank (SHARE MAIN BANK) 55.92 50.47
Number of banks (# BANKS) 5.16 5
Share of single banked ￿rms 10.8
Length of relation with main bank (years) 4.98 6
Share of ￿rms whose main bank is a top 5 group (TOP5) 63.46
Share of ￿rms whose relation with main bank ￿ 6 years 61.49
Number of ￿rms 33846
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: composition of the sample
SIZE SECTOR
Micro 4.01 Industry 49.1
Small 46.25 Service 34.7
Medium 40.70 Construction 7.3
Large 9.04 Other 8.9
LOCATION RATING
North 68.3 Sound 42.3
Center 18.1 Vulnerable 35.9
South 13.5 Risky 21.8Table 3: Share of ￿rms with positve credit growth
Credit>0 (%)
Whole sample smaller ￿rms lowest rating
September 09/September 08 38.65 39.25 35.06
December 07/December 06 59.39 58.40 61.78
December 06/December 05 60.97 60.61 62.56
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: normalized credit growth








Table 5: Share of ￿rms with positve credit growth and average credit growth
Credit>0 (%) ￿CREDIT/ASSETS (mean)
Whole Sample 38.65 -1.87
Smaller ￿rms 39.25 -1.66
Lowest Rating 35.06 -3.83
Main bank is top 5 38.42 -2.06
Single banked 38.02 0.21
Table 6: Average growth of credit as a function of length of relation with main bank
￿CREDIT/ASSETS (mean) number
Duration (years)






6 -1.94 20813Table 7: Correlation matrix of regressors
LEV ROE OM/VA SHST TD COLL. IR TOP5 #BANKS SH_MAIN LENG.
LEV 1.00
ROE -0.18 1.00
OM/VA -0.08 0.30 1.00
SHST 0.02 0.00 -0.04 1.00
TD 0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 1.00
COLLAT. 0.33 -0.07 0.02 -0.31 0.08 1.00
IR 0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.09 1.00
TOP5 0.17 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.12 0.02 1.00
#BANKS 0.47 -0.06 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.29 0.06 0.08 1.00
SH_MAIN -0.43 0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.18 -0.03 -0.05 -0.85 1.00








LEVERAGE -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.032***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ROE 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
TRADE DEBIT 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
COLLATERAL -0.211 -0.296** -0.242
(0.147) (0.146) (0.155)
INVESTMENT RATIO 0.006*** 0.006** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.224* -0.248* -0.231
(0.133) (0.133) (0.145)
# OF BANKS -0.810***
(0.102)
SHARE MAIN BANK 0.025*** 0.024***
(0.003) (0.003)
Length -0.186*** -0.185*** -0.191***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.045)
Observations 33846 33846 30190
R2 0.047 0.047 0.048
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects










LEVERAGE -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ROE 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
TRADE DEBIT 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
COLLATERAL -0.268* -0.347** -0.398** -0.467**
(0.145) (0.144) (0.183) (0.182)
INVESTMENT RATIO 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
# OF BANKS -0.770*** -0.613***
(0.107) (0.233)
SHARE MAIN BANK 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.005)
LENGTH -0.213*** -0.213*** -0.248*** -0.246***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.051) (0.051)
Observations 33846 33846 33846 33846
Number of banks 524 524
Combinations of ￿rst 3 banks 13489 13489
R2 0.046 0.047 0.041 0.041
Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects
Columns 1 and 2 include main bank ￿xed e⁄ects.
Columns 3 and 4 include ￿xed e⁄ects for combinations of the main three banks
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 10: Sample splits 1
Small ￿rms Manufacturing









LEVERAGE -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ROE 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT -0.008** -0.007** -0.016*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TRADE DEBIT 0.004 0.004 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
COLLATERAL -0.140 -0.232 -0.589*** -0.695***
(0.215) (0.213) (0.209) (0.207)
INVESTMENT RATIO 0.004 0.003 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.415** -0.432** -0.363* -0.387**
(0.193) (0.192) (0.190) (0.190)
# OF BANKS -0.896*** -0.906***
(0.154) (0.148)
SHARE MAIN BANK 0.028*** 0.029***
(0.004) (0.004)
LENGTH -0.190*** -0.189*** -0.234*** -0.230***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.064) (0.064)
Observations 17011 17011 16103 16103
R2 0.040 0.040 0.056 0.057
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 11: Sample splits 2
main bank not top5 lowest rating









LEVERAGE -0.019** -0.019** -0.053*** -0.055***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
ROE 0.007 0.007 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED -0.004 -0.004 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT -0.002 -0.002 -0.014** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
TRADE DEBIT 0.011 0.011 0.011* 0.011*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
COLLATERAL 0.071 0.001 -0.810** -1.025***
(0.433) (0.431) (0.335) (0.331)
INVESTMENT RATIO -0.004 -0.004 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.974*** -1.046***
(0.315) (0.315)
# OF BANKS -1.066*** -1.377***
(0.253) (0.248)
SHARE MAIN BANK 0.033*** 0.030***
(0.007) (0.007)
LENGTH -0.079 -0.077 -0.009 -0.016
(0.100) (0.100) (0.089) (0.089)
Observations 3925 3925 7387 7387
R2 0.064 0.065 0.071 0.070
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 12: Subsample with information on ￿rm level forecast of demand for credit









LEVERAGE -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.050*** -0.049***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
ROE 0.031** 0.031** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
TRADE DEBIT 0.005 0.003 -0.000 -0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
COLLATERAL -0.205 -0.266 -0.225 -0.277
(0.526) (0.525) (0.518) (0.512)
FIRM LEVEL FORECAST OF CREDIT DEMAND 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 0.153 0.120
(0.469) (0.467)
# OF BANKS -0.625* -0.573
(0.361) (0.387)
SHARE MAIN BANK 0.021** 0.021**
(0.010) (0.011)
LENGTH -0.101 -0.100 -0.094 -0.091
(0.144) (0.144) (0.150) (0.150)
Observations 2084 2084 2084 2084
Number of banks 169 169
R2 0.121 0.122 0.130 0.131
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects
Columns 3 and 4 also include main bank ￿xed e⁄ects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 13: Probability of positive credit growth
(1) (2) (3)
LABELS Pr(Credit>0) Pr(Credit>0) Pr(Credit>0)
LEVERAGE -0.000*** -0.000** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED -0.000** -0.000** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT 0.000 0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TRADE DEBIT 0.000* 0.000** 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
COLLATERAL -0.019*** -0.016** -0.012*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
INVESTMENT RATIO 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
# OF BANKS 0.014***
(0.005)
SHARE MAIN BANK -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LENGTH -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 33840 33840 30184
Log Pseudo-likelihood -22147.007 -22151.486 -19713.759
Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, in parentheses
All regressions include industry, region, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects
The table shows marginal e⁄ects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 14: Positive credit growth: Heckman 2 Step
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ￿CREDIT
ASSETS > 0 Pr(CREDIT>0) ￿CREDIT
ASSETS > 0 Pr(CREDIT>0)
LEVERAGE 0.019*** -0.001*** 0.021*** -0.001*
(0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
ROE 0.002 0.002*** 0.002 0.002***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED 0.013*** -0.000** 0.013*** -0.000*
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000*
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
TRADE DEBIT -0.039*** 0.001** -0.039*** 0.001**
(0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
COLLATERAL -0.210 -0.045*** -0.085 -0.038**
(0.194) (0.016) (0.190) (0.016)
INVESTMENT RATIO 0.005* 0.000 0.005* 0.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.208 -0.004 -0.181 -0.003
(0.165) (0.015) (0.166) (0.015)
# OF BANKS 0.795*** 0.031***
(0.141) (0.012)
SHARE MAIN BANK -0.017*** -0.000
(0.004) (0.000)
LENGTH -0.150*** -0.020*** -0.143*** -0.020***
(0.054) (0.004) (0.054) (0.004)
OVERDRAFT -0.387*** -0.393***
(0.048) (0.048)
MILL￿ S RATIO -6.056*** -6.431***
(2.100) (2.085)
Observations 13082 33846 13082 33846
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 15: Negative credit growth: Heckman 2 Step
(1) (2) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ￿CREDIT
ASSETS < 0 Pr(CREDIT<0) ￿CREDIT
ASSETS < 0 Pr(CREDIT<0)
LEVERAGE -0.038*** 0.001*** -0.045*** 0.001*
(0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
ROE -0.008** -0.002*** -0.007** -0.002***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED 0.001 0.000** -0.001 0.000*
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT -0.025*** -0.000 -0.024*** -0.000*
(0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
TRADE DEBIT 0.033*** -0.001** 0.031*** -0.001**
(0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
COLLATERAL 0.756*** 0.045*** 0.388* 0.038**
(0.232) (0.016) (0.212) (0.016)
INVESTMENT RATIO 0.003 -0.000 0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.117 0.004 -0.192 0.003
(0.203) (0.015) (0.190) (0.015)
# OF BANKS -2.509*** -0.031***
(0.171) (0.012)
SHARE MAIN BANK 0.052*** 0.000
(0.004) (0.000)
LENGTH 0.223*** 0.020*** 0.211*** 0.020***
(0.067) (0.004) (0.063) (0.004)
OVERDRAFT 0.387*** 0.393***
(0.048) (0.048)
MILL￿ S RATIO 15.49*** 14.571***
(2.803) (2.594)
Observations 20764 33846 20764 33846
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects










OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED -0.000 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002)




CAPITAL INTENSITY 0.006*** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.198 -0.222*
(0.133) (0.133)
# OF BANKS -0.816***
(0.102)








Robust standard errors in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects








OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001)




FIRM LEVEL DEMAND FOR CREDIT 0.177*** 0.181***
(0.061) (0.061)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.100** -0.096**
(0.049) (0.049)
# OF BANKS 0.156***
(0.045)





Log Pseudo-likelihood -418.99468 -422.83146
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects
The table shows marginal e⁄ects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 18: Robustness









LEVERAGE -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
ROE 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
OP MARGIN/VALUE ADDED -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
SHARE OF SHORT TERM DEBT -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.022*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
TRADE CREDIT 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.006**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
COLLATERAL -0.114 -0.241 0.130 0.024
(0.149) (0.147) (0.099) (0.099)
INVESTMENT RATIO 0.007*** 0.006** -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
￿CREDIT/ASSETS 2007 -0.004 -0.001
(0.007) (0.005)
￿CREDIT/ASSETS 2006 -0.033*** -0.000
(0.007) (0.000)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.253* -0.263* -0.132 -0.161*
(0.136) (0.135) (0.091) (0.091)
# OF BANKS -0.725*** -0.981***
(0.105) (0.068)
SHARE MAIN BANK 0.024*** 0.029***
(0.003) (0.002)
LENGTH -0.210*** -0.193*** -0.106*** -0.105***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.027) (0.027)
Observations 31782 33007 33846 33846
R2 0.049 0.048 0.061 0.063
Robust standard errors, clustered at the province level, in parentheses
All regressions include industry, province, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 19: Instrumenting the concentration of relationships
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ￿CREDIT
ASSETS #BANKS LENGTH ￿CREDIT
ASSETS SH MAIN LENGTH
2SLS 1STAGE 1STAGE 2SLS 1STAGE 1STAGE
LEVERAGE 0.047 0.098*** 0.0025*** 0.049 -0.3347*** 0.0025***
(0.042) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.043) (0.0071) (0.0005)
ROE 0.022*** 0.0004*** -0.0011*** 0.020*** -0.0106** -0.0011***
(0.004) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.0043) (0.0003)
OP MARGIN/VA 0.006 0.0010*** -0.0002 0.004 -0.0254*** -0.0002
(0.005) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.004) (0.0045) (0.0003)
SHARE OF SH.TERM D. 0.001 0.0016*** 0.0004 0.009 -0.0862*** 0.0004
(0.007) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.012) (0.0047) (0.0003)
TRADE CREDIT 0.018*** 0.0004* -0.0018*** 0.010** 0.0086 -0.0018***
(0.006) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.004) (0.0081) (0.0006)
COLLATERAL 1.482* 0.2105*** 0.1020*** 0.612 -3.4751*** 0.1020***
(0.867) (0.0074) (0.0203) (0.439) (0.2703) (0.0203)
INVESTMENT RATIO 0.012* 0.0004** -0.0028*** 0.005 0.0009 -0.0028***
(0.006) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.004) (0.0043) (0.0004)
MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.191 0.0202*** 0.0704*** -0.328* 0.1492 0.0704***
(0.156) (.0069) (0.0189) (0.169) (0.255) (0.0189)
# OF BANKS -8.994*
(4.627)




SMALL SIZE DEC05 -0.0944*** -0.2770*** 2.0069*** -0.2770***
(0.0111) (0.0323) (0.4095) (0.0323)
￿HERFINDAHL -0.0237 0.1668*** 1.579*** 0.1668***
(0.0158) (0.0447) (0.5855) (0.0447)
F-test 37.24 43.5 15.41 43.5
Observations 33320 33320 33320 33320 33320 33320
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include industry, macro-area, size and rating ￿xed e⁄ects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Table 20: Loan level data - dummy main bank
Dummy Main Bank Observations
1) BASE 0.362 59757
(0.529)
2) WITH BANKS FIXED EFFECTS 0.110** 59757
(0.054)
3) POSITIVE CREDIT GROWTH -1.796*** 23423
(0.093)
4) NEGATIVE CREDIT GROWTH 1.211*** 36334
(0.062)
5) LOWEST RATING 0.642*** 13772
(0.117)
6) MEDIUM AND HIGH RATING -0.143** 45985
(0.059)
7) MAIN BANK IS TOP 5 -0.284*** 38196
(0.067)
8) MAIN BANK IS NOT TOP 5 0.606*** 21561
(0.087)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
All regressions include ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects
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